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O'CALLAHAN AND ITS PROGENY: A SURVEY OF
THEIR IMPACT ON THE JURISDICTION
OF COURTS-MARTIAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the evening of July 20, 1956, Sergeant James E. O'Callaban, a
member of the United States Army stationed at Fort Shafter, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii was apprehended by a private security officer for breaking into the hotel room of a young girl, assaulting and attempting to rape
her. At the time of this incident, Sergeant O'Callahan was on an evening
pass, and was attired in civilian clothes. He was subsequently delivered
to military authorities; tried by a general court martial for attempted
rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape in violation of Articles 80, 130 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;' convicted
on all counts; and sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. After
granting a writ of certiorari, 2 the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,
reversed O'Callahan's conviction holding:
In the present case petitioner was on leave when he committed the
crimes with which he is charged. There was no connection - not
1. Art. 80 UNIVORM COD olt MILITARY JusTIca [hereinafter cited as UCMJI,
10 U.S.C. § 880 (1964), provides:
Attempts.

(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this code,
amounting to more than mere preparation and tending but failing to effect
its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this code who attempts to commit any offense
punishable by this code shall be punished as a court-martial may direct,
unless otherwise specifically prescribed.

(c) Any person subject to this code may be convicted of an attempt to
commit an offense although it appears on the trial that the offense was
consummated.
Art. 130 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1964), provides:
Housebreaking.
Any person subject to this code who unlawfully enters the building or
structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein
is guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct.
Art. 134 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), provides:
General Article.
Though not specifically mentioned in this code, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes
and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this code may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary
court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
punished at the discretion of such court.
2. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968). The defendant had collaterally
attacked this conviction by a coram nobis petition in the United States Court of
Military Appeals. This court accepted the petition but denied relief on the merits.
United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967). He then filed
a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court and appealed its denial to the
United States Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit affirmed this denial. United
States University
ex rel. O'Callahan
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even the remotest one - between his military duties and the crimes
in question. . . . We have accordingly decided that since petitioner's
crimes were not service connected, he could not be tried by courtmartial but rather was entitled to a trial by civilian courts.3
The purpose of this Comment is twofold: to provide a critical analysis
of the O'Callahan decision, itself, and to explore its subsequent impact
on the jurisdiction of military courts-martial.
II.

BACKGROUND

-

THE CONSTITUTION,

MILITARY COURTS,

AND PREVIOUS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION

A.

Courts-Martial - Constitutional Authorization, Limitation
of the Rights of Person Subject Thereto

It has been recognized that the demands placed upon the military
establishment also dictate that its members be subject to a mode of justice
variant from that available in common law courts. 4 The requirements of
discipline and efficiency under unusual or exigent conditions demand that

the trial and punishment of military offenders be swift, unimpeded by
certain of the safeguards otherwise guaranteed civilians. 5 Frequently, due
to the isolated regions in which a military organization is forced to operate, a system of civil courts is unavailable for the trial of military
offenders, and even where such courts are available, the requirement of
mobility dictates that military defendants, witnesses, and complainants,
be immune from confinement to a single location during the course of litigation. The military must, therefore, carry with it its own judicial system. 6

Recognizing such demands, the framers of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights enunciated a distinction between the rights and procedural
safeguards granted ordinary citizens and those extended to persons sub3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273-74 (1969) (emphasis added). At
the time of this decision the UCMJ authorized the court-martial of military personnel
for "non-military" crimes in two types of situations. Trial by court-martial was
authorized for certain specifically enumerated crimes when committed on or against
civilians. These included: murder (Art. 118), manslaughter (Art. 119), rape and
carnal knowledge (Art. 120), larceny and wrongful appropriation (Art. 121) robbery
(Art. 122), forgery (Art. 123), maiming (Art. 124), sodomy (Art. 125), arson
(Art. 126), extortion (Art. 127), assault (Art. 128), burglary (Art. 129), housebreaking (Art. 130), perjury (Art. 131) ; 10 U.S.C. §§ 918-31 (1964). A "general
article," Art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), authorized trial by court-martial for the
commission of any other federal crime of a non-capital nature without regard to its
military connection. Such crimes would include violations of state law insofar as it
became federal law by virtue of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
Under this Act the violation of other state or local laws could be punished by a
court-martial when such a violation could be characterized as a "disorder or neglect
to the prejudice of good order or discipline." See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 383-84 (1951). For a thorough discussion of the history and applicability of Article 134, see Hagan, The General Article - Elemental Confusion, 10
Mn.L. ,4v.63 (1960).
4. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 413 (T. Cooley ed. 1884); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
5. Id.
6. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ROTCM 145-85, MILITARY LAW
AND BOARDS or OitpFczRs 4 (1963).
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ject to military jurisdiction. Article I, section 8, clause 14 provides:

"The Congress shall have Power .

.

. to make Rules for the Government

and Regulation of the land and paval forces." This provision has been
construed to authorize the trial by court-martial of persons falling within
8
the authority granted Congress. It also indicates that such trials are
convened pursuant to the article I legislative power rather than under the9
"cases and controversies" catagorizations of the article III judicial power.
Therefore, such trials are not subject to the stipulation that "The trial
of all crimes, . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the

State where the said Crimes shall have been committed. . .. "10
The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger....

"

This provision makes it clear that there need be no indict-

can authorize military tribunals to
ment for such offenses as Congress
12
try under its article I power.
Such a limitation has been held by implication to apply equally to
1
the sixth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. 3 To extend
this right to cases cognizable by military tribunals, would abridge the
4
authority of Congress to govern the military by courts-martial.
B.

Limitations on Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial

The rights, deemed unavailable to persons subject to trial by military
courts, have traditionally held so prominent a place in American consti7. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). For a contrary
interpretation as to the original intent of this language, see Duke & Vogel, The
Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-MartialJurisdiction,
13 VAND. L. Rev. 435, 455-57 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,19 (1957).
9. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857); Comment, 13 VILL...
Rv. 170, 176 (1967).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
It should also be noted that inasmuch as article III does not extend to trials by
military tribunals, the military offender is not afforded the safeguards guaranteed
by section 1, e.g., the right to a trial before a judge installed "during good behavior,"
and receiving a salary "which shall not be diminished during... Continuance in Office."
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The last clause of this amendment
has been held to modify only the word "militia." See, e.g., Thompson v. Willingham,
318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963).
12. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5 (1955).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... "
14. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122-23 (1866) ; United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 36 (.1955) (Reed, J., dissenting). For an article
espousing the position that the Bill of Rights, with the fifth amendment exception,
was intended to apply to military personnel, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. Rev. 293 (1957). But see
Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L.
RXv. 1, 266 (1958). See also Antieau, Courts-Martial and the Constitution, 33 MARQ.
L. Rzv. 25 (1949).
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tutional experience that courts have always been circumspect to insure
that the jurisdictions of courts-martial not be extended beyond that necessary to insure the maintenance of order, morale, and discipline within
the armed forces. 15
In Ex Parte Milligan,'6 a landmark in Supreme Court history, the
Court held unconstitutional the conviction of an Indiana resident by a
military commission:
[Military jurisdiction granted by unwritten laws and usages of war]
can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the
and where the courts are open and their
authority of the government,
7
process unobstructed.'
The Court reached a similar conclusion in United States ex rel. Toth
v. Quarlesx8 where an honorably discharged Air Force veteran was convicted by a general court-martial for committing a murder while serving
in Korea. The Court ruled unconstitutional Article 3(A) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 9 insofar as it authorized discharged military personnel to be tried by court-martial for the commission of certain
crimes committed while in active service. In so doing it held:
For given its natural meaning, the power granted Congress "To
make Rules" to regulate "the land and Naval Forces" would seem
to restrict court-martialjurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed forces.20
The Court further reasoned that to permit the construction of this clause
in any other manner would necessarily constitute an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of article III courts where persons on trial are surrounded
21
by the full panoply of constitutional safeguards.
Relying on the reasoning enunciated in Milligan and Toth the Court
in Reid v. Covert2 2 ruled unconstitutional Article 2(11) of the Uniform
15.

Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize

trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
17. Id. at 12. Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamouku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), where the
Supreme Court held that the trial of civilians by military tribunals in Hawaii could
not be sustained under an executive proclamation of martial law.
18. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
19. Art. 3 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 803 (1964), provides:
(a) Subject to section 843 (article 43), no person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense
against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and
for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or

of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved from
amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of
that status.
This article, however, is still applicable to persons who subsequently return to military
status. See, e.g., United States v. Winton, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 222, 35 C.M.R. 194 (1965).
20. 350 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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Code of Military Justice insofar as it permitted the trial by court-martial
of a civilian dependent accompanying military personnel overseas. 23 In
so doing, it reversed the murder convictions of two service wives who had
been tried by general courts-martial. 24 Echoing the language of Toth the
court held:
But if the language of clause 14 is given its natural meaning, the
power granted does not extend to civilians - even though they may
be dependents living with servicemen on a military base. The term
"land and naval forces" refers to persons who are members of the
armed services. .... 25
The assurance that service dependents could not be subject to trial by
court-martial was subsequently extended to include non-capital crimes.
In Kinsella v. Singleton,26 the Court concluded that "[M]ilitary jurisdiction has always been based on the 'status' of the accused rather than on
the nature of the offense."' 27 In a companion case, McElroy v. Guagliardo,2 8 the reasoning of these decisions was applied to civilian employees
accompanying military forces overseas during times of peace. It was
deemed equally impermissible to try such persons by court-martial under
the aegis of Article 2(11).21
23. Article 2 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1964), provides in pertinent part:
The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States
is or may be a party or any accepted rule of international law,
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed
forces outside the United States and outside the following: the
Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
24. In Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956), a differently aligned court affirmed the defendants' convictions without
passing on the constitutional issue.
25. 354 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added). The court was aided in this construction
by reference to the correlative provision in the fifth amendment which it intimated
excluded only those persons actually in military service from the rights guaranteed
therein. 354 U.S. at 22.
26. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
27. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
28. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
29. It should be noted, however, that Article 2 (10) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802
(1964), permits the trial by courts-martial of persons serving with or accompanying an

armed force in the field in time of war. The Supreme Court has intimated that an
exercise of such power would be upheld.
In the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have
broad power over persons on the battlefront. From a time prior ot the adoption
of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances present in an area of actual
fighting have been considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in
that area by military courts under military rules.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957). The Court continued:
We believe that Article 2(10) sets forth the maximum historically recognized
extent of military jurisdiction over civilians under the concept of "in the field."
Id. at 34 n.61.
The concept "in the field" implies "military operations with a view to an
enemy." 14 Ops. ATT'Y GsN. 22 (1872). It has been said that the question of whether
an armed force is in the field is not to be determined by the locality in which it may be
found, but by the activity in which it is engaged at a particular time. See, e.g., Hines
v. Mikell, 259 F. 28, 34 (4th Cir. 1919), where it was held that forces assembled in
temporary cantoments for training in preparation for service in a theater of war
were "in the field."
One may be considered "accompanying" an armed force although he is not
directly employed by it, but works for a contractor engaged in a military project

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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These holdings combine to establish the proposition that no civilian,
be he a service dependant, a discharged veteran, or a non-uniformed employee, may be subject to a trial by court-martial when not actually accompanying a military force against an armed enemy. The significance of the
O'Callahan decision can be fully appreciated only when viewed from the
perspective of this doctrine and the reasoning contained in the holdings
which established it.
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONAL BASIS
OF O'CALLAHAN

A survey of O'Callahan's precursors indicates that the individual's
status was the sole consideration in determining amenability to trial by
court-martial. However, the O'Callahan court concluded that though
"status is necessary for jurisdiction," where the crime is "cognizable in
a civilian court" another element is essential - the crime must be "service
connected," i.e., some special relationship must exist between the alleged
crime and the accused's military status or the military society of which
he is a member. 80 When construed in the factual context of the principal
case it seems clear that this requisite would preclude the assertion of courtmartial jurisdiction over most crimes committed by servicemen against
civilians or perpetrated within the civilian community. Unlike its precursors, O'Callahan did not rely on the language contained in article I, section 8, clause 14 in imposing this limitation. Indeed, it could not, as
neither this language nor the precedents which have construed it, indicate
such a requirement. Rather, the Court implied such a limitation by relying
upon English and American constitutional history and by counterpoising
the clause 14 authority against the provisions of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing indictment and trial by jury in cases not "arising in the land or
naval forces." The Court noted that the first of the British mutiny acts
which falls within the term "in the field." Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 822 (1946). But see Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1969), noted in 55 A.B.A.J. 1097 (1969). This case held that recent
Supreme Court precedents, e.g., O'Callahan, preclude an expansive view of Article
2(10) ; that this Article could not be utilized to reach a civilian seaman, employed by
a private shipping company, who was charged with the commission of premeditated
murder while ashore at Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam. In United States v. Averette,
No. 22,457 (U.S.C.M.A., Apr. 3, 1970), (cited in 70-4 JuGE ADVOCAUE LEGAL SERVICE,
Apr. 23, 1970), the Court of Military Appeals limited the Article 2(10) jurisdiction
over civilians to periods of formally declared war, reversing a civilian defendant's
court-martial conviction for larceny while employed by an Army contractor in the
Republic of Vietnam. But see Weiner, Courts-Martial for Civilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968).
Dicta in the O'Callahan decision would tend to indicate that court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians can never be condoned, rendering impermissible the application of Article 2(10) to civilians accompanying military forces "in the field" under
all circumstances.
These cases decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction to try those who
are not members of the Armed Forces no matter how intimate the connection
between their offense and the concerns of military discipline.
395 U.S. at 267. For an evaluation of the probable impact of this language, see Nelson
& Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian Offenses":
An Analysis of O'Callahanv. Parker,54 MiNN. L. Rlv. 1, 53-55 (1969).
30. 395 U.S. at 272-73.
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permitted the court-martial of military personnel for mutiny, sedition,
and desertion, and provided that in all other respects such persons were
to be subject to ordinary legal process."' It intimated that this position
was followed by the American practice predating and contemporaneous
with the framing of article 1.32 Such a historical survey, however, is far
from conclusive. The O'CallahanCourt, itself, recognized that the British
Parliament's sparing exercise of its authority to create court-martial jurisdiction was the proximate result of flagrant abuses of this power while
in the hands of the British sovereigns as it was utilized by them in their
quest to gain ascendency over the people and the Parliament. 33
However, it appears that such abuses of this power were not feared
by the framers of article I of the Constitution when the power was placed
in the hands of the Legislature. Referring to clause 14 Alexander Hamilton stated:
These powers ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
34
may be necessary to satisfy them.
Elsewhere he asks:
Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this purpose [common safety] ? The government of the Union must be empowered to
pass all laws and to make all regulations which have relation to
them.3 5
Furthermore, as the dissenting opinion indicates, it appears that prior
to and comtemporaneous with the Constitutional Convention, the trial
by court-martial of military personnel for the commission of crimes having
no direct impact on the military service was recognized and sanctioned. 86
A "general article" of war permitting the trial of soldiers for "all crimes
not capital" by court-martial was adopted by the Continental Congress
in 1775. a1 Contemporary court-martial orders indicate numerous instances
31. 395 U.S. at 268-69, citing Mutiny Act, 1 W. & M. c. 5 (1689). This act
provides in part:
[n]oe Man may be forejudged of Life or Limb, or subjected to any Kinde of
punishment by Martial Law or in any other manner than by the Judgment of
his Peers and according to the knowne and Established Laws of his Realme.
32. See 395 U.S. at 270-71.
33. Id. at 268-69. See also dissent of Harlan, J., 395 U.S. at 276-77.
34. THP FEDERALIST No. 23 at 153 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 155.
36. 395 U.S. at 277-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. This Article provided:
All crimes, not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which officers and
soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,
though not mentioned in the articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a
general or regimental court-martial according to the nature and degree of the
offense, and be punished at their discretion .
Cited in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRicgDgNTs 957 (2d ed. 1896, 1920
reprint). This treatise indicates that this article encompassed crimes committed upon
or against civilians at or near a military post or camp. Id. at 724.
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in which this Article was utilized to try soldiers for the commission of
crimes of a non-military nature against the civilian populace. 8 General
George Washington, later to become President of the Constitutional Convention, recognized this power as a legitimate instrument for the maintenance of discipline. He wrote in 1779:
All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier
being destructive of good order and discipline as well as subversive
of the rights of society is as much a breach of military, as civil law
and as punishable by the one as the other.8 9
Such instances of contemporaneous sanction and usage when considered in light of the unqualified language of article I, section 8, clause
14 permit a conclusion that the framers did not intend to proscribe the
practice. Therefore, the limitation placed on the jurisdiction of courtsmartial by the O'Callahan Court seems unmerited insofar as it relies on
historical American practice and thought.
The O'CallahanCourt also reasoned that the express grant of power
to the Legislature must be harmonized with guarantees of the Bill of
Rights "lest 'cases arising in the land or naval forces' as used in the Fifth
Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services
of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of
his peers."'40 It is submitted, however, that the precursors of O'Callahan
struck such a harmonization by establishing as the: test for jurisdiction
that suggested by the "natural meaning" of clause 14 's language - that
amenability to trial by courts-martial is solely a function of one's status
and that as to those having the status of military personnel, the congressional power to determine the appropriate subject matter for court-martial
38. See, e.g., 13 WRITINGS O1 WASHINGTON 136 (George Washington Bicentennial ed. 1936) (trial of member of Washington's guard for destruction of an
inhabitant's home). Other examples of trial by court-martial of soldiers for crimes
against civilians include: plundering a civilian's home of "wearing Apparel and Household Furniture," Id. at 137; robbing a house of money, 14 WRITINGS OltWASHINGTON
424 (George Washington Bicentennial ed. 1936); "Breaking into and robbing the
house of . . . an inhabitant of a number of valuable articles . . . . " 15 WRITINGS OF
WASHINGTON 100 (George Washington Bicentennial ed. 1936); firing on a civilian
inhabitant while absent without leave, Id. at 131; "House-breaking and robbery,"
Id. at 163; "killing a cow and stealing fowls," 26 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 73;
"breaking into a house and insulting the inhabitants," Id. at 303. The majority in
O'Callahandistinguishes such cases on the grounds that the offenses were committed
in wartime and within the theater of operations. 395 U.S. at 270 n.14. However, a
reading of these cases fails to elicit any practical distinction between the factual
situations reported therein, and those surrounding O'Callahan's offense. Similarly,
nothing in these reports tends to indicate that jurisdiction was assumed because the
acts were committed during wartime and in a theater of war. It also should be noted
that the dissent indicates that court-martial jurisdiction was assumed over similar
offenses committed between 1783 and 1795, e.g., "[the court-martial of] Private Kelley
for abusing and using violence on Mrs. Cronkyte, a citizen of the United States."
395 U.S. at 278 n.3. It would seem that the "theater of war" distinction could not be
utilized to distinguish the latter situations from that encountered in O'Callahan.
39. 14 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 140-41 (George Washington Bicentennial
ed. 1936).

40. 395 U.S. at 272-73.
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is unqualified. 41 It would also seem that the authors of the Bill of Rights,
themselves, contemplated such a harmonization between the congressional
power "to make rules for the regulation of the land and naval forces,"
and the Bill of Rights guarantees, as the "cases arising" exception to the
fifth amendment guaranty, when viewed in its historical perspective, would
include crimes of a non-military nature committed by persons in military
service.42

It is also arguable that the "necessary and proper clause, ' 43 when
read in conjunction with clause 14, would permit military personnel to be
tried by court-martial for offenses committed against civilians as such
jurisdiction is a necessary adjunct of the power to maintain order and
discipline within the service. 44 In its effort to "harmonize" the power
granted Congress in clause 14 and the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
the Court failed to recognize that the military has a legitimate and frequently vital interest in regulating the relationship of its members with
the civilian community. 45 Many of the reasons which demand a system

of military justice in a purely "military" situation are equally compelling
when applied to a military-civilian context. The passage or encampment
41. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957). Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.

509, 514 (1878). See also Duke & Vogel, supra note 7, at 441. It is arguable, however, that clause 14 was not inserted in the Constitution for the purpose of granting
Congress plenary authority to prescribe procedures for punishing members of the
armed forces but to make it clear that the powers so included should not devolve upon
the executive branch. Id. at 448-49, 455. It is also arguable that the framers would
not have intended that Congress possess an unqualified ability to strip the serviceman
of many of the constitutional rights guaranteed civilians had they envisioned the
contemporary composition of our armed forces. At the time of the enactment of the
Constitution the 800 man army consisted exclusively of volunteers and professional
soldiers, individuals "who could be said to have chosen [their] world and the law
that went with it." Comment, Servicemen In Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380, 396
(1966). Present military requirements, however, demand a military force consisting
of over 3 million men, most of whom are non-professionals - conscripted for a short
term or serving solely because of indirect compulsion. As a result "the status of [the]
soldier merges more and more with that of [the] civilian." Sutherland, The Constitution, The Civilian and Military Justice, 35 ST. JOHN's L. Rgv. 215-16 (1961).
The Supreme Court had long recognized a congressional right to authorize
the trial by court-martial of service personnel for the commission of crimes of a nonmilitary nature. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907) ; Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 185 (1886) ; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878).
42. See historical survey p. .....
supra.
43. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, provides:
The Congress shall have power .

.

. to make all Laws which shall be neces-

sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers rested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.
44. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20 (1957), the Court took the position that
the necessary and proper clause was not available to support jurisdiction over persons
not actually "in" the land or naval forces within the meaning of clause 14, reasoning
that the necessary and proper clause was available only in aid of jurisdiction within
the permissible limits of clause 14. Although the necessary and proper clause may
not be utilized to extend military jurisdiction to persons not in the service, it may
be helpful in defining those acts which fall within its jurisdiction. See Duke & Vogel,
supra note 7, at 440 n.24. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the necessary and proper
clause would not lend constitutional support to the exercise of courts-martial jurisdiction over all crimes committed against civilians, e.g., those having no adverse effect
on good order and military discipline. Id. at 457-58 (see hypothetical).
45. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 281-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1886).
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of a sizable military unit near a civilian populace is sometimes accompanied by the perpetration of acts of violence against the civilian population. 46 Civilian law enforcement authorities may lack the resources to
cope with a sudden rash of such conduct.47 In such situations unless the

military has the capability of swiftly disciplining those responsible for
these incidents, not only would the offenders escape punishment, but also
crimes against the civilian population would tend to multiply since no
effective deterrent would exist. Misconduct of a serviceman within the
civilian community also tends to bring discredit upon the service of which
he is a member. 48 Where a military installation adjoins a civilian locality
the misconduct of a few servicemen frequently fosters an animus between
the military and civilian communities. Such a general hostility toward
servicemen uniformly deprives all persons assigned to the military installation the services and hospitality which the civilian community would otherwise provide.
Granting civilian law enforcement authorities exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed within the civilian community can have other deleterious effects which the system of military justice was designed to prevent. 49 The soldier who is unable to meet bail and is incarcerated pending
trial or who is convicted and imprisoned by civilian authorities is rendered unavailable for training or duty with his unit. The individual
released on bail or on his own recognizance could be required to remain
within the jurisdiction of the civilian court depriving the military of flexibility in his utilization. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in his dissent,
analogous procedures under military law would permit participation by
the accused serviceman in his units' activities to an extent consonant with
the crime he has allegedly committed"0 or of which he has been convicted5 '
46.
It is a matter well known that the march even of an army not hostile is
often accompanied by acts of pillage and violence . . . by straggling parties of
soldiers, which the most rigid discipline is hardly able to prevent.
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878).
47. Id. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 281 n.9 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. at 281.
49. See, e.g., Glines, Military Justice: on Trial, ARMED FORCZS MANAGEMENT,
Feb. 1970, at 38.
50. 395 U.S. at 282-83. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES U 20
(rev. ed. 1969), provides in pertinent part:
An officer authorized to arrest (21a) may, within his discretion and without imposing arrest, restrict an accused person of his command or subject to his authority,
to specified areas of a military command with the further provision that he will
participate in all military activities of his organization while under restriction.
51. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES Uf88 (rev. ed. 1969), provides
in pertinent part:
e. Suspension of execution of sentence.
At the time he approves a sentence, the convening authority may suspend
for a stated period of time the execution of all or any part of it except
a sentence of death. The purpose of suspending the execution of a sentence
is to grant the accused a probationary period within which he may by refraining from further misconduct earn the remission of his sentence.
f. Deferment of service of sentence to confinement.
Under the provisions of Article 57(d) the officer who convened the court
or, if the accused is no longer under his jurisdiction, the officer exercising
general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the accused is
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and do not require that the trial be held in the jurisdiction where the
offense was committed.5 2 Similarly, the military services provide programs
and facilities for rehabilitating the serviceman-defendant and restoring
him to duty status.5 3 Confinement in a civilian penal institution would
deprive both the military and the serviceman-prisoner of the opportunities
provided by these facilities.
Perhaps the Court's failure to recognize such legitimate interests in
the trial and punishment of non-military crimes was the result of its great
concern with the possibility of command influence over the participants
in a court-martial. It pointed out that at the time of O'Callahan's courtmartial, the "convening authority" 54 held direct command authority not
only over the members of the court and the counsel whom he appointed 5
but also frequently over the "law officer" who presided over the trial.5 6
However, in promulgating such a widely pervasive rule it would seem
that greater deference should have been paid the recent changes in courtmartial procedure. The Military Justice Act of 196811 enacted several
important changes designed to eliminate the possibility of command influence. Of these the Court recognized only one - that under the 1968 Act,
the office of the military judge is designed to insure that the presiding
officer of a court-martial would not be a subordinate of the convening
authority. 58 The Act also provides however, that in non-capital cases with
the concurrence of the military judge, the accused may elect to be tried
by the judge sitting alone.5 9 Thus, the defendant who fears the presence
of biased court members can insure himself of a trial before an officer
beyond the influence of the convening authority. The Act further prohibits a superior officer, in preparing a subordinate's efficiency report,
from commenting unfavorably as to that person's conduct as a court
member or as to his zeal as a defense counsel.60 The threat of such comassigned, may, in his sole discretion and upon application by the accused,
defer an accused's service of sentence to confinement, which has not been
ordered executed.

52. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES ff 8 (rev. ed. 1969).
53. See AR 190-19, CORRECTIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES (1968); Herrod, The

United States Disciplinary Barracks System, 8 MIL. L. Rxv. 35 (1960).
54. For a delineation of the function of the Convening Authority at the time of
O'Callahan's trial, see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES If 7-9 (1951).
55. 395 U.S. at 264.
56. Id. at n.3. For an enumeration of the functions of the law officer at the time
of O'Callahan's trial, see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES f 55-56
(1951).
57. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-73 (Supp. IV, 1968). This Act became effective August
1, 1969.
58. 395 U.S. at 264 n.3. The 1968 Act has redesignated the law officer the
"military judge." For a discussion of the function of the "military judge" under this
Act, see Mounts & Sugarman, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470
(1969).
59. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES ff 53d(2) (rev. ed. 1969).
60. Art. 37(b) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (Supp. IV, 1968), provides:
In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report, or any other
report or document used in whole or in part for the purpose of determining
whether a member of the armed forces is qualified to be advanced, in grade, or in
determining the assignment or transfer of a member of the armed forces or in
determining whether a member of the armed forces should be retained on active
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ment was probably the most significant means for exerting command influence upon court members and defense counsel. It would seem that the
addition of these provisions should have had a measurable impact on the
Court's decision to promulgate the O'Callahan rule as these and the other
modifications incorporated in the 1968 Act are designed to eliminate the
same potential abuses which seem to have played a significant part in
motivating the Court to rule as it did.

IV.

THE IMPACT OF O'CALLAHAN ON THE SCOPE OF
JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURTS

The most undesirable feature of the O'Callahan decision is that it
places the jurisdiction of military courts in a state of uncertainty. 6 ' Construed in the context of the issues framed by the Court itself, 62 two elements must coalesce in order to divest a military court of jurisdiction: the
alleged crime must be "cognizable in a civilian court," and it must be
without "service connection." However, it neither indicated the civil courts
duty, no person subject to this chapter may, in preparing any such report (1)
consider or evaluate the performance of duty of any such member as a member of
a court-martial, or (2) give a less favorable rating or evaluation of any member
of the armed forces because of the zeal with which such member, as counsel,
represented any accused before a court martial.
It has been proposed that an independent corps of "circuit riding" defense counsel,
similar to the field judiciary, be established. It would seem that such a system would
further eliminate the possibility of command influence over defense counsel. Statement
of Dean Kenneth Pye, Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 566 (1962).
61. See 395 U.S. at 283-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Another serious question
left unanswered by the O'Callahan Court is whether the jurisdictional limitations
placed upon military courts will be applied retroactively. Immediately after the announcement of this decision, the Judge Advocate General of the Army estimated that
in the Army alone, 450,000 courts-martial might be invalid under the O'Callahan
standard. These convictions could be challenged not only by some 4,000 servicemen
currently confined by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but also by persons seeking
back pay, veterans' benefits, and burial privileges in military cemeteries. The Washington Evening Star, June 6, 1969, at A-3. In Mercer v. Dillon, Misc. Doc. No. 69-57
(U.S.C.M.A., Mar. 6, 1970), cited in 70-2 JUDG4 ADvocAvx LWGAL S-Rvics 2 (Mar.
12, 1970), the Court of Military Appeals held that O'Callahan should not be applied
retroactively except to cases subject to direct review and, therefore, not final on the
date of the O'Callahandecision. The court evaluated O'Callahanin light of the guidelines for granting retroactive application enunciated in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), i.e., the purpose to be served by the new standard, the extent of reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standard, and the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice. It concluded that application of each of these
guidelines to O'Callahan would dictate that it be applied prospectively. It also analogized O'Callahan to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), where the Supreme
Court held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees defendants a right to a jury trial
in state courts. It reasoned that inasmuch as the Court had subsequently ruled that
this requirement would have only prospective application, DeStefano v. Woods, 392
U.S. 631 (1968), the requirements set forth in O'Callahan should similarly be so
limited. The Supreme Court has indicated that it might rule on the retroactive application of O'Callahan. Redford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks,
38 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S., Feb. 27, 1969). See note 87 infra. For a thorough treatment
of the question of applying O'Callahan retroactively, see Nelson & Westbrook, supra
note 29, at 39-46.
62.
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War ... have jurisdiction
to try a member of the Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime
cognizable in a civilian court and having no military significance....
395 U.S. at 261, citing O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
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to which it referred nor delineated any pervasive standards for distinguishing between "service connected" crimes and those that are not.
A.

Availability of an Alternative Forum

The Court intimated that the jurisdictional limitation will not apply
where no civil forum is reasonably available. Commenting on the circumstances surrounding O'Callahan's crime it stated:
Moreover, Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under
military control, as are some of our far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses were
committed within our territorial limits, not in the occupied zone of
a foreign country. 3
However, just what judicial presense is sufficient to divest a military
court of its jurisdiction over a crime is not clear. O'Callahan's offense,
though a violation of the Articles of War, also violated the substantive
law of the Territory of Hawaii. Since this law derived its existence from
the Federal Government 6 4 it is arguable that a narrow reading of
O'Callahanwould limit its scope to violations of the Articles of War which
are also crimes cognizable in a federal civilian court.6 5 A majority of the
members of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 6 however, have
rejected such a limited application of the rule. In United States v.
Borys,6T it encountered a factual situation similar to that in O'Callahan.
The defendant, an Army Captain, was tried by general court-martial and
convicted of rape, robbery, and sodomy. The acts had been committed
in civilian communities in Georgia and South Carolina where they constituted violations of state law. In reversing the conviction, the majority
held that the language of O'Callahan required a broad construction and
concluded that the phrase "cognizable in a civilian court" was intended
63. 395 U.S. at 273-74.
64. See JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE POR ANNEXING THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

UNITUD SATMS, 30 Stat. 750 (1898), which provided that the Congress of the
United States should finally determine appropriate municipal legislation for the Islands;
cf. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
65. See United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969)
(Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
66. The Court of Military Appeals is composed of three civilians and was established by Congress in 1951. See 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964). This court was originally
conceived of as "a civilian 'supreme court' for the review of court-martial convicTo TH

tions. . .

."

Walker & Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals -

Its History,

Organization and Operation, 6 VAND. L. Rpv. 228 (1953). Genealogically,
[The court's) roots lie in the historical development and improvement of military
criminal law, a history that is marked by repeated conflicts between military commanders and interested civilians. These conflicts were, however, relatively minor
altercations until the twentieth century, when large citizen armies in two World
Wars brought millions of Americans, including many lawyers, into intimate
contact with the court-martial system.
Id. at 229, Comment, supra note 9, at 172 n.10.
67. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969).
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to include crimes punishable in state as well as federal courts. 68 Inasmuch
as the avowed purpose of the rule enunciated in O'Callahanis to guarantee the serviceman charged with a non-military offense, a trial by jury
whenever constitutionally required, such an interpretation would seem
correct as this safeguard has been guaranteed to violators of state as well
as federal criminal laws. 9 The converse of this rationale, however, has
been adopted by the Court of Military Appeals to defeat the application
of the O'Callahanrule. In United States v. Sharkey,70 this court was confronted with a conviction for drunkenness and disorder in a public place.
It reasoned that since the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury does
not extend to petty offenses, and local courts are not obligated to supply
these benefits for the trial of such acts, the intent of the O'Callahan rule
would not be frustrated by permitting these offenses to be tried by courts71
martial.
A similar rationale could also be applied to any act committed within
the civilian community which does not violate its substantive criminal law
but is, nevertheless, violative of military law. 7 2 Since such an act would
not be cognizable as a crime in the civilian court so as to entitle the perpetrator to indictment and trial by jury, it would seem that the offense
would be amenable to trial by court-martial without regard to its "service
connection."
The Court of Military Appeals has adopted a similar approach in
considering the amenability of crimes committed within friendly foreign
nations to trial by military tribunals. Although faced with an act which
it deemed service-connected - an assault on a fellow serviceman within
the Philippine Republic, the court in United States v. Keaton7 8 considered
the jurisdiction of military courts over non-service connected crimes com68. Id. at 549, 40 C.M.R. at 259.
69. See Duncan v. Louisana, 391 U.S. 415 (1968), where the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment guaranty of a right to trial by an impartial jury extended
to criminal defendants accused of serious state crimes by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment. A collateral benefit of divesting military courts of jurisdiction over crimes
violative of local law, where the right to trial by jury is guaranteed, is that the
offender is insulated from the possibility of double jeopardy. An indivdual punished
by court-martial for the commission of a crime violative of both military and federal
law cannot thereafter be tried for the same offense by a federal civilian court. Grafton
v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1906). However, where the offense is violative
of both military and state law, trial by one court does not foreclose the possibility of
a subsequent trial by the other. This principle is based on the constitutional doctrine
that the federal and state governments derive their existence and jurisdiction from
separate sovereigns. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878) ; Nelson &
Westbrook, supra note 29, at 55-56; cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189-96
(1959). In the instances where O'Callahannow forbids cognizance of a state criminal
offense by a military court because of its lack of "service connection" this theoretical
exposure to double jeopardy is reduced.
70. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
71. Id. at 27-28, 41 C.M.R. at 27-28.
72. See United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969),
where the court held inter alia that since the off-post use of marijuana was not a
crime cognizable in a local civilian court, it could be tried as a violation of Article 134
without regard to the non-service connected nature of the offense.
73. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969).
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mitted in foreign countries. 74 The court reasoned that if such offenses
were to come within the purview of the O'Callahan doctrine, the serviceman who commits them must have available the constitutionally guaranteed benefits of an indictment and trial by jury as an alternative to trial
by a military court. Inasmuch as the Constitution of the United States
applies only to trials by state or federal courts of the United States, such
guarantees are not available in Philippine courts. Therefore, the local
civilian courts could not be looked to as such an alternative.
Viewing Keaton and O'Callahan from a theoretical stance, it would
appear that in those instances where jurisdiction is waived by the foreign
government, the accused could be returned home for trial by a civilian
article III court, as it is permissible to try United States citizens for crime
committed abroad.75 However, since the authority of Congress to designate crimes cognizable by article III courts is limited to matters relating
to some power expressly granted or to an act specifically enumerated,76
there are a large number of codal offenses which could not be cognizable
by an article III court and for which the serviceman could not be returned
to the United States for trial. Therefore, as to these offenses, the article
III courts of the United States cannot provide the alternative necessary
to divest military courts of jurisdiction.
However, the court did not limit its holding to such cases. Reading
the clause 14 power in conjunction with the "necessary and proper clause,"
the court further reasoned that:
When [clause 14 is] read in this manner it seems clear that foreign
trial by court-martial of all offenses under the Code committed abroad,
including those which could be tried by Article III courts . . . is a
77

valid exercise of constitutional authority.

It would seem that such reliance upon the "necessary and proper clause"
in extending court-martial jurisdiction to all crimes committed overseas,
regardless of justiciability by an article III court, is contrary to the intent
of O'Callahan. This decision implicitly rejects the "necessary and proper
clause" as a justification for extending court-martial jurisdiction to
offenses which are otherwise non-service connected when they are cognizable by a court which is bound by the Bill of Rights. 78 Nevertheless.,
subsequent decisions of the Court of Military Appeals have applied the
74. It should be noted that under pertinent provisions of the STATUS or FORCES
Government

AGuRxMsNT WITH THE REPUBLIC ort THE PHILIPPINES, the Philippine

would have the primary right to assert jurisdiction over non-service connected offenses.

However, this right could be waived in favor of an American military tribunal.
AGRzZMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC Or THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNING MILITARY BASES,
Mar. 14, 1947, art. XIII, 61 Stat. 4019, T.I.A.S. No. 1775, as amended, Aug. 10, 1961,
16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. 5851.
75. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964).
76. See United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 670, 672 (1877).
77. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969) (second
emphasis added).
78. See 395 U.S. at 272-73; 38 Gto. WASH. L. REv. 170, 175 (1969).
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doctrine enunciated in Keaton to all foreign offenses without considering
9
service connection or cognizability by American civil courts3
B.

The "Service Connected" Offense

A more elusive problem is posed by the court's failure to establish any
pervasive definition of the "service connected" offense. It relegates pertinent considerations for distinguishing such offenses to the status of
dicta80 and a single footnote. 8 ' The Court made it clear that any crime,
regardless of its nature, which is committed within a military reservation
will remain punishable by court-martial.8 2 It implied that the military has
a special interest in such crimes as they involve the "security and integrity"
of the installation.88 Relying on this language, the Court of Military
Appeals has affirmed the conviction of an airman for carnal knowledge
simply because the acts occurred at various locations in on-base housing.84
It has permitted a military court to try a seaman of unpremeditated murder where the offense occurred on a public bus within the confines of a
naval station.8 5 Similarly, it has sustained that part of a multi-offense
sodomy conviction where the acts took place within a military camp.86
This court has even upheld a robbery conviction in spite of the fact that
the actual taking occurred within the civilian community because it found
that the force and assault elements of the offense occurred within a military reservation.8 7 In each of these cases the court simply adopted the
79. See United States v. Gill, No. 22,398 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 22, 1969) (robbery

of two German citizens) ; United States v. Easter, No. 22,278 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 14,
1969) (attempted housebreaking).
80. In commenting on O'Callahan's offense the Court observed:
The crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; nor was the
person whom he attacked performing any duties relating to the military.... The
offenses did not involve any question of flouting military authority, the security
of a military post, or the integrity of military property.
395 U.S. at 273-74.
81. The Court drew similar distinctions in distinguishing early military trials for
civilian-type offenses with O'Callahan's crime:
In almost every case summarized, it appears that some special military interest
existed. Many are peculiarly military crimes - desertions, assaults on and thefts
from other soldiers, stealing government property. . . . Many of the remainder
are identifiably prosecutions for abusing military position by plundering the civil
population or abusing its women while on duty ....
Those few which do appear
to involve civilian crimes in clearly civilian settings appear to have been committed by officers. In the 18th century at least the "honor" of an officer was
thought to give a specific military connection to a crime otherwise without
military significance.
Id. at 270 n.14.
82. See note 80 supra.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609,40 C.M. R. 321 (1969).

85. United States v. Allen, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 41 C.M.R. 31 (1969).

86. United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969).
87. United States v. Carpo, .18 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 40 C.M.R. 306. For other
examples of on-post crimes of a civil nature where jurisdiction has been sustained,
see United States v. Paxiano, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969) (wrongful
appropriation of a civilian owned vehicle) ; United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
605, 40 C.M.R. 317 (1969) (uttering worthless checks). But see United States v.

Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969), where the Court of Military Appeals

rejected the argument that the defendant's act of bringing a stolen automobile on
base so compromised the security of the post that court-martial jurisdiction should
vest. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case raising the question of
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language of O'Callahan, concluding that such jurisdiction was a necessary
incident of the power to maintain security within a military installation.
The Supreme Court further intimated that any offense committed
against another serviceman could continue to be construed as peculiarly
military in nature.8 8 The Court of Military Appeals has accordingly sustained robbery and housebreaking convictions when committed against
fellow servicemen although the crimes occurred respectively in a motel s
and at an off-base residence.90 It similarly sustained a conviction for
breaking into a Marine Officer's off-post quarters in spite of the fact that
the defendant apparently lacked knowledge of the resident's military connection, and although it dismissed other counts of the housebreaking conviction which involved civilian residences. 91 This latter result has
prompted Judge Ferguson of this court to call into question the O'Callahan
Court's intent in including offenses against other service personnel in its
catalog of crimes traditionally "military in nature." He indicated that
since the military interest in a crime as this one is of such a tenuous nature,
that this language should be construed to include only crimes against other
service personnel which are committed within a military installation. 92
Moreover, it would seem that insofar as military interest is concerned,
no essential difference exists between this housebreaking conviction and
a court-martial conviction for carnal knowledge of a fellow serviceman's
fourteen-year old daughter which the Court of Military Appeals dismissed
for lack of service connection.9" Such an anomaly, however, is the inevitable result of the O'Callahan Court's substitution of equivocal historical
examples for a comprehensive standard which realistically balances the
needs of the military with the interests of the individual offender and the
civilian community.
The language of O'Callahansuggests that in certain situations crimes
committed against civilians or perpetrated within a civilian community can
the constitutionality of assuming court-martial jurisdiction over servicemen who
commit offenses against civilians within a military installation. The question was
certified as follows:
(1) Does [a] court-martial have jurisdiction to try [a] soldier charged with
raping and kidnapping women on a military base while he was on active duty?
(2) Does O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), bar [a] court-martial from
trying a soldier for committing [a] crime against [a] civilian on [a] military
base and if so, should O'Callahan be applied retroactively?
Redford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 38 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S., Feb.
27, 1970).
88. 395 U.S. at 270 n.14; See note 81 supra.
89. United States v. Nichols, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 43, 41 C.M.R. 43 (1969); accord
United States v. Plamondon, Hansen & Coty, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 22, 41 C.M.R. 22 (1969).
90. United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969).
91. United States v. Comancho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969).
92. Id. at 12, 41 C.M.R. at 12.
93. United States v. Henderson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969). The
Court of Military Appeals has also reversed that portion of a conviction for uttering
forged checks which took place after the reserve officer to whom the blank checks
belonged had returned to civilian life. United States v. Halladan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46,
41 C.M.R. 46 (1969). Similarly, it has dismissed a conviction for larceny of an automobile in spite of the fact that its owner was a retired Army major. United States v.
Arme, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969,.,
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also be deemed service-connected. The court exemplified such situations
during its discussion of O'Callahan'scrime and in the course of its historical survey of court-martial jurisdiction. It intimated that requisite
nexus could be found in crime involving military position or authority,
and in offenses committed against other persons performing duties relating
to the military. 94 It further suggested that other relevent considerations
might include the perpetrator's rank, 95 his duty status, and his attire.96
An enumeration of such diverse factors, once again exemplifies the
necessity of deriving a common denominator that will provide local commanders and their staff judge advocates with a reliable gauge for determining whether an offense possesses the requisite service connection.
Judge Ferguson, viewing the aggregate of the situations in which O'Callahan might permit the assertion of court-martial jurisdiction, has suggested
such a standard. It reflects his reasons for hesitating to permit courtmartial cognizance of all crimes committed against fellow-servicemen,
regardless of circumstance despite O'Callahan's intimation that jurisdiction within this sphere might remain untouched. 97
The gravamen of the term "service connected" as formulated by the
Supreme Court in O'Callahan is, in my opinion, the actual impact of
If the offense tends realistically
the offense on military matters ....
toward some direct deleterious effect on military matters or discipline,
then the offense is "service-connected." If, however, the effect on
military matters is remote, then military jurisdiction may not constitutionally attach. 98
This test, it would seem, embodies the common element pervading the
examples to which the O'CallahanCourt alluded. Crimes committed under
the aegis of military authority or connection tend directly to discredit the
service of which the offender is a member. The resultant distrust for
military personnel would severely hamper both official and unofficial military-civilian relationships. Similarly, an offense against a person performing duties relating to the military directly impedes the accomplishment of
the service's assigned objectives and any offense when committed by an
officer seriously compromises the offender's leadership effectiveness and
his value to the service.
Though Judge Ferguson would seem to apply the standard to any
offense committed by a serviceman on American soil but outside the con94. See notes 80, 81 supra.
95. See note 81 supra.
96. The fact that Sgt. O'Callahan was on a pass at the time of his crime appears
to have been given some significance by the Court as it is included as a pertinent
factor in the question which had been certified for certiorari, 395 U.S. at 261, citing

O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).

The Court also noted the fact that

O'Callahan was attired in civilian clothes at the time of his apprehension. 395 U.S.

at 259.
97. United States v. Nichols, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 43, 41 C.M.R. 43 (1969)

(Ferguson,

J., dissenting).

98. Id. at 45, 41 C.M.R. at 45. For an analysis suggesting several other approaches

for determining the "service connection" of a given offense, see Nelson & Westbrook,
supra note 29, at 24-34.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/6
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fines of a military installation, it appears that all the members of the
Court of Military Appeals would adopt this approach in determining the
justiciability of offenses committed against civilians or perpetrated within
the civilian community. It also appears, however, that each of the three
members of this court has a different concept as to what constitutes a
sufficient "impact" on the military to permit cognizance by military court.
A survey of recent decisions involving such offenses is demonstrative of
these observations.
In United States v. Harris" and United States v. Stafford, 0 0 two
non-commissioned officers were convicted under Article 134 of conspiracy
to communicate and transmit defense information.' 0 ' The respective trial
courts found that the accused had conspired with several officials of the
Soviet diplomatic mission to obtain and pass information relating to the
national defense. While noting that jurisdiction to try such offenses was
within the purview of federal district courts, the Court of Military Appeals
unanimously affirmed the defendant's convictions by courts-martial. It
relied on little else than the fact that the offenses directly affected the
government and operation of the military establishment as the documents
which the defendants conspired to compromise were immediately connected with military operations and their security was entrusted to military authorities. Similar reasoning has been applied to cases involving
possession and use of barbiturates or marijuana. In United States v.
Castro0 2 and United States v. Beeker, 0 3 where the respective defendants
were convicted of off-post possession and use of amphetamines and marijuana in violation of Article 134, this court, again, unanimously agreed
that jurisdiction was properly assumed. It held that because such use has
disastrous effects on the health, morale, and fitness for duty of persons
in the armed forces, that requisite service connection can be found. It
also agreed that the mere possession of marijuana or barbiturates so prejudices good order and discipline that the military possesses the requisite
interest to try any serviceman accused of such conduct regardless of the
situs of the act.
Such unanimity however, does not extend to the class of offenses
whose only impact is the fact that the acts, themselves, or the circumstances under which they are committed, tend to discredit the armed
forces. Offenses such as uttering worthless checks or wrongfully appropriating an automobile, when committed within a civilian community,
99. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 40 C.M.R. 308 (1969).

100. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33, 40 C.M.R. 33 (1969).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 793(c), (e) (1964).

102. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969). Accord United States v. Rose,

19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969), where this principle was extended to unlawful
delivery of barbiturates to another serviceman whether off or on base.
103. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969). The court, however, concluded
that unlawful transportation and importation of marijuana, not involving actual possession, is not a crime subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial, since such conduct
is violative of federal law and the commission of the offense lacks any special relation
to Villanova
the military.
Published by
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are in themselves, considered non-service connected crimes. 10 4 However,
if the facts and circumstances surrounding such an offense appear to
indicate that the offender's military status facilitated its commission, a
majority of this court will find that sufficient impact has been exerted
upon the armed forces to support assumption of jurisdiction. In United
States v. Peaks,10 the defendant, attired in a fatigue uniform and identifying himself as a member of the armed forces assigned to a local unit,
persuaded an automobile dealer to permit him to take a test drive in an
automobile. The defendant never returned and was subsequently convicted by court-martial for wrongful appropriation. In sustaining the
conviction the court reasoned:
It appears that the accused's military standing facilitated his deception of the automobile salesman and permitted him to misappropriate
the vehicle. It seems reasonable to assume that when the used-car
salesman gave permission for the accused to test drive the car, he
attributed some reliability to the accused as a result of the latter's
identification by his military fatigues as a member of the armed
forces. Such an abuse of a military status is likely to influence the
extent of confidence by the public in members of the armed forces.
We believe the impact of such an abuse is direct and substantial
enough to provide the requisite service-connection for the armed
forces to exercise jurisdiction over this offense. 10 6
Various other facts and circumstances may permit a similar inference.
Servicemen who use their military identification or a military address in
connection with cashing stolen 0

7

or forged10 8 checks or who achieve this

end merely by representing themselves as military personnel' 0 9 have been
deemed to cause sufficient reliance to be placed on their military status
to permit the requisite service connection to be found. The "reliance"
doctrine has also been invoked when a serviceman attired in the uniform
of a Marine Corps Officer incurred excessive hotel bills which he was
subsequently unable to pay" 0 even though the facts of the case failed to
indicate that any other representations as to this status had been made.
It appears, however, that the attitudes of the three members of the Court
of Military Appeals vary significantly in the essentiality of facts tending
to indicate reliance. The doctrine that discrediting conduct exerts a sufficient impact on the military to vest jurisdiction only when reliance upon
military status can be shown, appears to be the product of Judge Dardan's
104. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605, 40 C.M.R. 317 (1969)
(uttering a worthless check) ; United States v. Armes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R.
15 (1960) (larceny of an automobile).
105. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969).
106. Id. at 20-21, 41 C.M.R. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
107. See United States v. Frazier, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 41 C.M.R. 40 (1969).
108. See United States v. Hallahan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969).
109. See United States v. Morrisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).
110. United States v. Fryman, No. 22,318 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 14, 1969).
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reasoning."' It seems that Chief Judge Quinn would find that discrediting conduct exerts the requisite impact whenever any circumstance surrounding the commission of the act tends to indicate that the perpetrator
is a member of the armed forces. This attitude is exemplified in United
States v. Armes" 2 where the defendant had been convicted by a courtmartial of larceny of an automobile belonging to a civilian. The majority
of the court concluded that even though the defendant was wearing a
fatigue uniform at the time of the theft, since the crime involved property belonging to a civilian and was committed within the civilian community, it lacked the requisite service connection. In a dissent, Chief
Judge Quinn reasoned that since the defendant was attired in a fatigue
uniform when the crime was committed, the conviction should have been
sustained simply because an observer of such discrediting conduct could
associate the perpetrator with the armed forces. It would seem, however,
that assuming the validity of the "impact" test as the standard for determining service-connection, Judge Dardan's approach is the more reasonable because, as a matter of degree, the military has a much more immediate interest in preserving its integrity with regard to persons with whom
its members must deal than with the public in general. The acts punishable under this approach also involve abuses of special privileges or
courtesies commonly granted members of the armed services because of
their status. The military has a similar interest in preserving these benefits so that its members can continue to enjoy them. Moreover, it seems
that no significant variance in service discredit exists between offenses
where the perpetrator is contemporaneously identified as a serviceman,
and those where his service connection is made known subsequent to the
commission of the offense. Inasmuch as the latter is a consequence of
literally all offenses committed by servicemen, it is obvious that such
identification cannot in se provide a basis for jurisdiction. Judge Ferguson, on the other hand, would not consider an inference that the offender's
military status facilitated his criminal act a sufficient basis to permit cognizance by a military court in the absence of other service connecting
factors. In a situation where assumption of jurisdiction was predicated
on the fact that the writer of a forged check had included his name and
rank on the indorsement, Judge Ferguson argued that whether this
data actually aided the writer in the commission of the offense was a
matter of pure speculation." 3 His principal basis for disagreement, however, seems to be the fact that the militarily harmful consequences of the
acts do not stem from their nature as a Codal offense, but from circumstances which are entirely collateral to the offenses charged. In dissenting
from the affirmance of a conviction for wrongful appropriation of an
automobile he stated:
111. See, e.g., United States v. Peak, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969).

112. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969).
113. United States v. Hallahan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969) (Ferguson,
J., Villanova
dissenting).
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The fact that the accused was in uniform or made representations
as to his military status is simply irrelevent insofar as the wrongful
appropriation of this car is concerned. How then can it be said that
this is a factor to be considered in determining the question of
14
1

jurisdiction.

Under the Ferguson rationale, a crime whose only service connecting
impact is the fact that it is discrediting to the service is properly chargable
only under Article 134 since the tendency "to bring discredit to the armed
forces" is an element of that offense." 5 However, since it is impermissible
to charge a person with violating Article 134 when his conduct is specifically punishable by another punitive article, 116 the thief or forger cannot
be charged with an Article 134 violation as the means for punishing his
discrediting conduct. Such a requirement, it appears, constitutes an unnecessary qualification of Judge Ferguson's own "impact" standard, as
O'Callahan,itself, implicitly recognizes that the collateral effects evolving
from the commission of a non-military crime, may under certain circumstances, permit a military court to assume jurisdiction over the substantive offense." 7
The disparate positions taken by these three judges of the Court
of Military Appeals on the question of service discrediting conduct illus114. United States v. Peak, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 21, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969) (Ferguson,

J., dissenting). For an explication of the facts of this case and the rationale of the

majority, see text supra at note 106.
115. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
116. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 213(a) (rev. ed. 1969).
It also appears that Judge Dardan would not permit assertion of jurisdiction over a
civil offense simply because the act was service discrediting and properly chargeable
under Article 134, but would require an additional element, e.g., reliance on military
status, before finding the requisite impact to exist. United States v. Fryman, No.
22,318 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 14, 1969).
117. The O'Callahandecision recognized that the military has traditionally held a
special interest in crimes involving "abuse of military position." Notes 80, 81 supra.
It also indicated that a crime involving the "flouting of military authority" could be
cognizable by a military court. Id. It would also seem that the Court's recognition
of a traditional military interest in the punishment of any crime committed by an
officer, likewise, indicates approval of assuming jurisdiction over such offenses merely
because of their collateral effects upon the service. Id. Thus, it is arguable that under
the "direct impact" test, an officer accused of a non-service-connected crime could be
tried by a military court for both the substantive offense, where the act is violative
of a particular punitive article, and for conducting himself in a manner unbecoming an
officer in violation of Article 133 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), as such conduct
substantially compromises his value to the service. Reflecting on the majority's
language, however, Mr. Justice Harlan states:
It is to say the least, strange that as a constitutional matter the military
is without authority to discipline an enlisted man for an offense that it may punish
if committed by an officer.
395 U.S. at 283 n.11 (emphasis Harlan, J.). In United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), where an Army Captain was convicted by a court-martial
of sodomy, rape, and robbery, the Court of Military Appeals reversed the convictions.
Judge Ferguson rejected the O'Callahan majority's inference and adopted a position
similar to that stated in Justice Harlan's dissent:
I do not construe the implication which appears in footnote 14 of the majority
opinion as a determination that the status of an officer justifies military trial for
an offense not otherwise constitutionally triable by court-martial. In this regard,
I believe an officer "is not clothed with any less constitutional . . . rights than is
an enlisted person."
Id. at 550 n.1, 40 C.M.R. at 560.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/6

22

DePue: O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the Juris
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15

trates the problem inherent in the judicial application of even a pervasive
standard to diverse and unique factual situations. Confronted with similar
sets of factual circumstances, each member of this court has responded
with a peculiar opinion as to whether the military has a sufficient interest
in the type of conduct questioned or its consequences to permit courtmartial jurisdiction to vest. The guidance afforded by such variant applications of the "direct impact" test is, then, not significantly greater than
O'Callahan's own multi-factor approach. It would also seem that the
members of the judiciary lack an adequate appreciation of military needs
and interests 118 to render accurate appraisals of the "impact" of a given
offense on the military and of its interest in the act's consequences. It is,
therefore, submitted that the Congress should, once again, re-evaluate
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It should particularly revise the
punitive articles in a manner that will reflect the doctrine enunciated in
O'Callahan"0 and refined by Judge Ferguson's "direct impact" standard
and the cases that apply to it. Such a revision should include a re-definition
of the various substantive offenses, incorporating as elements thereof, the
circumstances in which the military believes the unlawful conduct exerts
such a direct and substantial impact upon its well-being as to justify cognizance by a court-martial.
This re-evaluation would provide commanders and their legal advisors
with an operating guide of greater clarity than a judge-made test, and
although the standards so enunciated would not be binding upon the federal
civilian courts, they would provide them with the benefit of the armed
forces' expertise in instances when it is necessary to evaluate the "service
20
connection" of a given act.
118. See 38 Gzo. WASH. L. Rzv. 170, 176 (1969).

119. It is noteworthy that, although the Toth and Reid decisions rendered uncon-

stitutional portions of Articles 2(10) and 2(11) of the UCMJ as enunciated in the
1951 MANUAL IOR COURTS-MARTIAL, the Military Justice Act of 1968 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801-73 (Supp. IV, 1968), failed to revise these provisions to conform to the
holdings of Toth and Reid and they appear in the 1969 Revision of the MANUAL in
their original form.
120. Judicial deference to a Congressional enactment delineating the scope of jurisdiction it believes a federal court can exercise consistently with constitutional principles
would be by no means unique. The Constitution confers upon the United States courts
"all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. However, precisely what constituted an "admiralty" or "maritime" case was unclear and it
remained for the court in each case before it to determine whether the facts reasonably
fell within the compass of the Constitutional provision. United States v. Matson
Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1953). Congress, therefore, has on several
occasions sought to define the scope of such jurisdiction, even to the extent of expanding it to encompass cases which had traditionally been recognized as falling without
the maritime jurisdiction. In 1845, Congress abolished the traditional "tidewater"
limitation on the maritime jurisdiction of federal courts, defining the jurisdictional
grant to encompass certain cases arising upon navigable lakes and the waters connecting them. 5 Stat. 726 (1845), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964). In The Genese
Chief, 53 U.S. 443 (1851), this definition of the scope of federal maritime jurisdiction
was followed by the Supreme Court in spite of the fact that it had previously rejected
the inclusion of cases arising on non-tidal waters in the maritime jurisdiction. The
Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). For a detailed discussion of this
development, see D. ROBsRTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 104-16 (1970).
More recently Congress had included within the definition of "maritime jurisinvolving
damage
injury
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byRepository,
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Published bydiction"
Villanovacases
University
Charles
Widgeror
School
of Law
Digital
1970 or property on

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 6

SPRING

1970]

COMMENTS

V.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion in O'Callahan is a monument to result orientation and judicial imprecision. Although predicated on the assumption that
the military justice system is an instrument of discipline rather than justice and as a result fails to provide the accused with many of the pro21
cedural safeguards insured in civilian courts,' the decision fails to make
a meaningful and objective comparison of the two systems and the relative merits of each. Though it emphasizes the fact that military courts
substitute a panel of possibly intimidated officers for an impartial jury
of the accused's peers, 122 it fails to note that several significant rights
land. Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). The legislative view of the

proper expanse of maritime jurisdiction was, again, respected by the courts. In upholding the assumption of maritime jurisdiction under the aegis of this Act the Ninth
Circuit observed:
We have abundant reason to realize that our experience and new conditions give
rise to new conceptions of maritime concerns. These may require that former
criteria of jurisdiction be abandoned as, for example . . . in discarding the doctrine
that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to tidewaters.
United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 1953), citing
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934). See Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963) ; Fematt v. Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.
Cal. 1961).
121. It should be noted that several of the constitutional guarantees which the
O'CallahanCourt seeks to obtain for military defendants do not operate on state courts
where most trials will take place. The fifth amendment right to a grand jury indictment binds only federal courts. See, e.g., Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S.
31, 35 (1890). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not impose
this requirement on the state courts. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656-57 (1948).
These courts are free to initiate criminal proceedings by the filing of an information
by the prosecuting attorney. See, e.g., Moore v. Henslee, 276 F.2d 876, 878 (8th
Cir. 1960).
A procedure roughly analogous to the federal practice of preliminary examination and grand jury indictment is provided servicemen to be tried by a general
court-martial by the Article 32 investigation. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964). Although the
recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the charges, unlike a similar
recommendation by a grand jury, does not result in an automatic dismissal, the Article
32 investigation in several respects, grants the accused greater safeguards than a
federal grand jury. Murphy, The Formal Pretrial Investigation, 12 MIL. L. Rzv. 1,
10 (1961). A federal grand jury may return an indictment without the accused having
any knowledge of its proceedings. The military defendant, on the other hand, has the
right to be present during the investigation, to cross-examine witnesses appearing for
the prosecution, and to call witnesses of his own. He also has the right to be represented by counsel at no cost. Art. 32(b), 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964). For a thorough
discussion of the Article 32 investigation, see Murphy, supra. It, therefore, appears
that where O'Callahan requires a serviceman accused of a serious offense to be tried
in a state court lacking a grand jury indictment procedure, rather than assuring him
of a significant right, this case would deprive him of one.
Similarly, the Article III requirement that judges shall hold office during good
behavior does not bind state courts. State court judges may be appointed for varying
terms, elected, or a combination of both. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCzSs 26-39
(1962). It is submitted that the judge who must seek re-election is under the same
type of pressure which the O'CallahanCourt feared the law officer had been subject
to as a subordinate of the convening authority. It, therefore, seems that this decision
does not effectively assure servicemen of standing trial before a judge who is insulated
from such extra-judicial pressures. It would also appear that, inasmuch as the
Military Justice Act of 1968 removes the military judge from the command of the
convening authority and alleviates the possibility for such pressure, O'Callahan, in
some instances, would deprive the military defendant of a safeguard otherwise available to him.
122. See 395 U.S. at 265-66. The O'Callahan Court does note, however, that the
UCMJ requires courts-martial to be comprised of at least one-third enlisted members
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/6
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guaranteed the accused in military courts have no analogue in many state
courts, 128 where military defendants will now stand trial with greater

frequency. 124 Rather, it speaks of the military justice system to which
Judge (now Chief Justice) Berger has referred as "the most enlightened
military code in history"' 25 only in terms of disparagement and condescension. The Court's conclusion is ostensibly grounded upon a balancing of
the congressional power to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" with the rights guaranteed the criminal
defendant by the fifth and sixth amendments. It fails, however, to explore
when requested by the accused. Id. at 263 n.2. Article 25 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825

(1964).

It is arguable that in many instances a military court, composed exclusively
of officers, would be more objective as a trier of fact than its civilian counterpart, the

petit jury. The educational qualifications possessed by military officers are higher
than those of a cross section of the typical civilian community; a large percentage
possessing college degrees. Thus, such a board could be compared to a blue ribbon

jury, a device designed to minimize prejudice. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 121, at
109. It would also seem that a petit jury drawn from a civilian locality would be
inclined to reflect in its determinations any prejudices which the community as a whole
might harbor toward service personnel stationed in the surrounding area.
123. For example, few states require the appointment of counsel where the maximum punishment cannot exceed six months confinement. Nelson & Westbrook, supra
note 29, at 61. Generally, the military accused must be provided with legally qualified
counsel, at no cost to himself, whenever requested. Previously, this right was limited
to those to be tried before a general court-martial. The 1968 Military Justice Act,
however, has extended this right to those to be tried by special court-martial unless,
because of physical conditions or military exigencies, legally qualified counsel cannot
be obtained. Art. 27(c) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. IV, 1968). This exception,
however, has been limited to rare circumstances and it is never applicable within the

continental United States.

MANUAL

FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITD STATES

1 6(e)

(rev. ed. 1969) ; AR 27-10, MILITARY JUSTiCE
2-14 (1968). The accused has also
been given the right to refuse trial by summary court-martial, the equivalent of magistrate's court, and to demand a special court-martial in lieu thereof. Art. 20 UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. IV, 1968). Likewise, with the exception of individuals
embarked on or attached to a vessel, the accused can demand a special court-martial
in lieu of accepting non-judicial punishment under Article 15. Art. 15(a) ; MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES ff 132 (rev. ed. 1969).
Therefore, for all
practical purposes, the military defendant is guaranteed representation by an attorney
whenever he faces the possibility of punishment. See Nelson & Westbrook, supra
note 29, at 61.
124. It appears that the Court of Military Appeals will not permit the military defendant, accused of a crime cognizable in a state court, to consent to trial by court-martial in lieu of trial by the civilian forum. In United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969), the accused was convicted by general court-martial of robbery of a gas station within the civilian community. Through the efforts of his counsel
he had obtained a release from the civilian authorities who initially apprehended him
by agreeing to stand trial by court-martial. The Court of Military Appeals reversed
conviction on the ground that the military court lacked jurisdiction over the offense.
Although it failed to specifically comment on the defendant's attempt to "waive his
right" to stand trial before a civilian court, it is submitted that the position of the
majority in ignoring such an attempt is correct. Where a court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case, the defect is not cured by the defendant's assenting to
personal jurisdiction. "Such a want of jurisdiction cannot be waived by pleading or
any other form of consent - not even going to trial." Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F.2d
855, 857 (2d Cir. 1938). This axiom seems to have been overlooked by Chief Judge
Quinn who, in his dissent, equated "waiver" of the "right" to trial by a civilian court
to waiver of other constitutionally-guaranteed procedural rights.
125. United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 940 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (Berger, C.J., dissenting), aff'd 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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legitimate and important governmental interests in retaining jurisdiction
over offenses committed by military personnel within the civilian community. It similarly refuses to come to grips with the unequivocal language of Article I, section 8, clause 14 and the precedents construing it,
all of which indicate that as to persons in the armed forces, Congress, and
not the Court, has the responsibility for determining amenability to courtmartial.
The most serious shortcoming of this decision, however, is its failure
to define the current jurisdiction of military courts in a manner that will
provide a reliable guide for those who must operate under it.126 The only
hints given the reader as to the meaning of the deceptively simple phrase
"service connected" are contained in dicta describing the circumstances
surrounding O'Callahan's crime and in equivocal historical examples.
The principal responsibility for defining the scope of this decision has
devolved to the United States Court of Military Appeals which has developed several pervasive standards for its application. Construing the holding
in light of its ostensible purpose, this court has concluded that military
courts may retain jurisdiction over offenses whenever the right of a jury
trial is not constitutionally guaranteed. Such a limitation would permit
military courts to try minor offenses without regard to service connection,
and any violation of military law having no analogue in local civil courts.
This analysis has been further extended to permit military courts to assume
jurisdiction over any crime committed abroad.
126. The problems of practical application resulting from this imprecise language
are analogous to the problems raised by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
After evaluating this decision, Professor Enker and attorney Elson concluded:
[T]he future may see the Supreme Court withdraw considerably from the broad
language of ...

Escobedo. In the meantime, however, the lower courts -

federal

and state - and the law enforcement officers lack the guidance necessary to
enable them to administer the new tests. These undesirable effects . . . stem
principally from the Court's failure to articulate its premises clearly ....
Enker & Elson, Counsel for the Suspect, 49 MINN. L. Rzv. 47, 91 (1964).
Inasmuch as the O'Callahan decision relates to the jurisdiction of military
courts over the subject matter of an offense, it will also provide fertile ground for
collateral attacks of future court-martial convictions via writs of habeas corpus in

federal district courts. Such attacks could prove extremely disruptive of the military
appellate system, if interposed prior to the exhaustion of the defendant's military
remedies. See Nelson & Westbrook supra note 29, at 47. In Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S.
683 (1969), however, the Supreme dourt held that, unless the petitioner can show that
prompt and effective relief is unavailable in the Court of Military Appeals, failure to
exhaust military remedies prior to seeking habeas corpus in federal civil courts is
inexcusable. Id. at 698. In so deciding the Court, per Mr. Justice Harlan, emphasized
that Congress purposely vested the power to review military decisions in a specialized
court so that disinterested civilian judges could gain an understanding of the distinctive
problems of the armed forces. Although in Noyd the petitioner contended that his
confinement violated certain technical provisions of the UCMJ, it would seem that this
limitation on the use of habeas corpus writs would apply equally to jurisdictional
challenges based on O'Callahan. In such situations, no less than those involving
specialized questions concerning the UCMJ, a court having expertise in military

matters should be able to lend its experience in determining the question of "service
connection" prior to review by a civilian court. Not only would application of this
procedure prevent disruption of the military appellate system but the resultant determinations by such courts would provide helpful guidelines to federal civil courts. For

a thorough discussion of the question, see Nelson & Westbrook, supra note 29, at 46-52.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/6

26

DePue: O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the Juris
738

[VOL. 15

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

Relying upon the language of O'Callahan and the examples presented
therein, this court has also formulated a standard for determining an act's
"service connection." It is predicated upon the impact which the court
deems the offender's conduct to exert on the service of which he is a
member. Although such an approach provides a guide of greater accuracy
than do the examples to which the O'Callahandecision alluded, it is submitted that optimum guidance would be afforded by a legislative revision
of the punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a manner
reflecting the guidelines promulgated by this court. Such a revision, it
would seem, could not only embody the new jurisdictional limitations
placed upon military courts, but also indicate those situations in which
the military deems that an offense exerts the requisite impact to justify
assertion of jurisdiction.
John F. DePue
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